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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MEDICARE PRICE PROBLEMS AND THE RUC:
WAGGING THE DOG
“You have to be alert, and the public has to be alert. Cause that is the
war of the future, and if you’re not gearing up, to fight that war, eventually
the axe will fall.” — Conrad Brean1
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite extensive reform under The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA),2 there remains much to be accomplished in terms of
implementation and regulation of the new law and there are numerous
unaddressed problems.3 Among the issues lost in the debate of health
reform is the continued use of the Relative Value Scale Update Committee
(RUC);4 a committee specifically designed to guide CMS in setting
reimbursement rates for Medicare.5 While the RUC is not directly
responsible for setting the reimbursement rates for Medicare, it heavily
influences the process by which rates are initially set and subsequently
reviewed.
However, since the RUC is not a licensed Federal Advisory Committee
(FAC),6 it is not subject to the advisement standards of other FACs, as
outlined in the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (FACA).7 Further,
1. WAG THE DOG (New Line Cinema 1998).
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10202(c)(1)(A),
124 Stat. 119, 924 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396(d) (2011)) [hereinafter ACA].
3. See, e.g., John Jacobi et al., Implementing Health Reform at the State Level: Access
and Care for Vulnerable Populations, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 69-70 (2011) (discussing
potential obstacles in health reform including shortages in primary care physicians in addition
to issues between eligibility for health insurance versus actual enrollment).
4. See Miriam J. Laugesen, Roy Wada & Eric M. Chen, In Setting Doctors’ Medicare
Fees, CMS Almost Always Accepts the Relative Value Update Panel’s Advice on Work Values,
31 HEALTH AFF. 965, 970 (2012) (identifying the relatively few changes made by the ACA to
CMS’s update process). Section 3134 of the ACA does require that CMS increase data
collection and analytics. This includes adjusting incorrect values for services most notably
“services with the fastest growth in utilization, new technology, services billed together, and
services that have not been reviewed since the payment system was implemented.” Id.
5. “RUC” is colloquially pronounced “ruck.” AM. MED. ASS’N., AMA/SPECIALTY SOCIETY
RVS UPDATE COMMITTEE REPORT (2012), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/
rbrvs/ruc-is-ruc-is-not.pdf.
6. Id.
7. See Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92–463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. App. § 2 (2012)) (noting the term “advisory committee means any
175
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CMS’s rate setting methods remain excluded from judicial review due to a
procedural safeguard,8 leaving no effective remedy to change the outcome
of misvalued Medicare rates. Here, application of the FACA to the RUC,
through either legislative or regulatory change, will improve transparency of
the RUC’s advisement and improve the rate setting process without
completely overhauling the current system.
A recent suit brought against HHS and CMS alleged that the RUC
disproportionately represents specialist physicians and argued that the RUC
should be subject to review under the FACA.9 On August 8, 2011, six
primary care physicians filed a complaint against CMS and HHS for
ostensibly accepting recommendations made by the RUC without review and
charged that the effects of the RUC’s recommendations have led to a
significant gap between primary care physicians and specialists.10
This case encapsulated an ongoing battle of primary care physicians,
lobbyists, and politicians over the RUC’s vitality and nature.11 One of the
physicians most essential points is that the exclusivity, privacy, and immunity
by which the RUC operates when calculating the relative value units (RVU),
which disproportionately reward specialist physicians over primary care
physicians, is detrimental to the Medicare fee schedule and should be
subject to scrutiny under the FACA.12
The court dismissed the case on the grounds that “Congress has
precluded courts from reviewing, not only the final relative values and RVUs,
but also the method by which those values and units are generated.”13
Previous courts have remarked that this preclusion aids the Secretary to
make quick and efficient decisions regarding annual evaluations of RVUs,14

committee, board commission, council conference, panel, task force, or other similar group,
or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof . . ., which is – (A) established by statute or
reorganization plan, or (B) established or utilized by the President, or (C) established or utilized
by one or more agencies,” which the RUC does not fit that definition and is therefore not
subject to advisement standards set forth in the FACA).
8. Brian Klepper, Medicare Physician Payment: A Hollow Victory for the RUC, HEALTH
AFF. BLOG (May 18, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://www.heatthaffairs.org/blog/2012/05/18/
medicare-physician-payment-a-hollow-victory-for-the-ruc/.
9. Brian Klepper, A Legal Challenge to CMS’ Reliance on the RUC, HEALTH AFF. BLOG
(August 9, 2011, 1:28 PM), http://www.heatthaffairs.org/blog/2011/08/09/a-legal-chal
lange-to-cms-reliance-on-the-ruc/.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Complaint at 2-3, Fischer v. Berwick, 2012 WL 1655320 (D. Md. 2012) (No. WMN11-2191).
13. Fischer, 2012 WL 1655320, at *2. See also Klepper, supra note 8.
14. Am. Soc’y of Cataract & Refractive Surgery v. Thompson, 279 F.3d 447, 454 (7th
Cir. 2002) (discussing congressional intent of this preclusion, which helps the Secretary make
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but have not commented on the fairness or accuracy of the decisions.
Further, these courts and the Fischer court have avoided any evaluation or
discussion of the requirement that federal advisory bodies adhere to the
FACA.15
This comment will argue, in spite of the court’s sidestepping, that the
RUC should in fact be governed by the FACA. First, an examination of the
RUC and the current Medicare fee schedule will demonstrate the current
problems and practices exhibited by the RUC. Then, an explication on the
history of the FACA and its functionality will expound on the importance of
FACs and the review of those committees’ decisions. Lastly, a comparison of
the RUC’s practices and the provisions of the FACA will show that the RUC’s
advising has taken place in the shadows of Medicare payment reform. This
has helped lead to imbalanced reimbursement for Medicare and private
payers and effectively incentivizing an entire sector of specialized healthcare.
II. BACKGROUND
The U.S. trails other developed nations in health quality and health cost
efficiency.16 This crisis can be traced in part to the decline of primary care
and preventative care services,17 which many scholars attribute to the
adoption of the Resource Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS).18 This
payment system was implemented in 1992, as part of the newly established
Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (MPFS).19 Following growing concerns
about the rapid rise in the cost of physician services, Congress enacted the
MPFS as a part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989.20 Prior
to the implementation of the RBRVS, Medicare physicians had been paid
based on the Usual, Customary, and Reasonable (UCR) system founded by

quick and efficient decisions regarding RVU adjustments under a budget neutrality
requirement).
15. See generally id. at 447-56 (lacking discussion and analysis on the requirement that
federal advisory bodies adhere to the FACA). See also Fischer, 2012 WL 1655320, at *1-6.
16. Lewis G. Sandy et al., The Political Economy of U.S. Primary Care, 28 HEALTH AFF.
1136, 1136 (2009).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Paul B. Ginsberg, Rapidly Evolving Physician-Payment Policy – More than
the SGR, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 172, 173 (2011); John D. Goodson, Unintended
Consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale Reimbursement, 298 JAMA 2308,
2308 (2007).
19. Stephanie Maxwell & Stephen Zuckerman, Impact of Resource-Based Practice
Expenses on the Medicare Physician Volume, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., no. 2, 2007-08 at
65, 65.
20. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 789-90 (6th ed.
2008).
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Blue Shield in the 1950s.21 This allowed for great fluctuations between
communities and eventually led to physicians setting their own rates of
reimbursement, which became a significant cost problem after the
enactment of Medicare.22 However, with the advent of the RBRVS, Congress
hoped to address these issues by using variable rates.23
In theory, this new practice made significantly more sense. It had less
discretionary input and adjusted for a number of different particular variants.
The new MPFS corrected distortions from the previous charge-based
payment system and was intended to encourage efficiencies in medical
practice.24 The MPFS was believed to be the solution to other problems as
well, such as the growing discrepancy between payments for evaluation and
management services and payments for technical service procedures, as
well as unexplainable cost variations arising in rural areas.25 The result of
these distortions is believed to have “discouraged physicians from practicing
in primary care specialties and in rural areas.”26 It is believed that these
distortions also encouraged a “procedurally oriented style of care.”27
Unfortunately, the system now suffers from myriad new problems and the
accurate valuation for practice expenses has gotten worse.28
Under the new MPFS, the Secretary of CMS was charged with
developing a methodology for calculating valuations,29 which eventually
resulted in the utilization of the RBRVS when the Secretary engaged a section
of the statute allowing extrapolation and “other techniques” to determine
these values.30 These values are known as relative value units, or RVUs, and
became the basis for all payments in the MPFS.31

21. SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 614 (2nd ed.
2012).
22. Id.
23. See Paul B. Ginsberg & Robert Berenson, Revising Medicare’s Physician Fee Schedule
– Much Activity, Little Change, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1201, 1201 (2007).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Ginsberg & Berenson, supra note 23, at 1202.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(A)(i) (2011).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(A)(ii). The system was designed through Harvard studies,
but did not originally include estimates for practice expense RVUs, so the RBRVS practice
expenses were based upon historical physician charges until 1999. At this time, CMS began
phasing in resource-based practice expense RVUs by relying on “estimates of service-specific,
direct expenses, pricing data, and specialty-specific, practice-level expenses.” Laura A.
Dummit, Medicare Physician Fees: The Data Behind the Numbers, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y FORUM,
July 22, 2010, at 7.
31. See generally FURROW ET AL., supra note 20, at 790 (discussing the physician fee
schedule and the method for calculating payments using RVUs).
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As the fundamental unit of measure for the MPFS, and the basis for
each payment calculation, the RVU component is actually three separate
cost components, or three separate RVUs: (1) physician work (PW); (2)
practice expenses (PE); and (3) malpractice insurance (MP).32 The PW
component is the most complex. It must account for four categories of input:
time, mental effort and judgment, technical skill, and psychological stress33
(or the “time and intensity” involved in providing a medical service).34
It is estimated that the work component accounts for 50% of the total
payment per service.35 The PE component is a reflection of the necessary
equipment and resources used in providing a specific medical service.36 This
can include anything from renting office space, to equipment purchases, to
staff costs.37 Different PE RVUs can be applied depending on where the
services are delivered (e.g., at a doctor’s office, ambulatory surgery center,
or hospital).38 The final RVU component, MP, is based upon the malpractice
insurance required for the physician rendering the service.39
RBRVS payment rates are founded on three different components: a
weighted value, which is the RVU, prescribed to a specific medical
procedure, a geographical adjuster, and a conversion factor.40 The other
two adjusters — the conversion factor (CF) and the Geographical Practice
Cost Index (GPCI) — are significant factors in adjusting costs to account for
medical inflation and the differences in costs to practice around the country,
respectively.41 Each component is then adjusted to account for area price
differences under the GPCI before the three components are summed and
multiplied by the conversion factor to arrive at an appropriate
reimbursement per service rendered.42

32. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w–4(c)(2)(A)(i), (c)(2)(C)(i)-(iii) (2011). See also Maxwell &
Zuckerman, supra note 19.
33. See William C. Hsiao et al., Estimating Physicians’ Work for a Resource-Based
Relative-Value Scale, 319 N. ENG. J. MED. 835, 836 (1988); AM. MED. ASS’N., RVS UPDATE
PROCESS (2012), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/rbrvs/ruc-updatebooklet.pdf; and MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: PROMOTING
GREATER EFFICIENCY IN MEDICARE 236 (2007), available at www.medpac.gov/documents/
jun07_EntireReport.pdf.
34. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PHYSICIAN FEE SCHEDULE: PAYMENT
SYSTEM FACT SHEET SERIES 3 (2011) [hereinafter MPFS FACT SHEET].
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. FURROW ET AL., supra note 20, at 790.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(b)(1)(A)-(C) (2011). See also MPFS FACT SHEET, supra note
34, at 2.
42. MPFS FACT SHEET, supra note 34, at 3.
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The output of this equation is then assigned an identifying number under
CMS’s Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) and the American
Medical Association’s (AMA) Common Procedural Terminology (CPT).43
Essentially, to determine a single billing amount for a given medical service,
there are three separate RVUs, each of which is multiplied by a separate and
distinct GPCI.44 These three totals are then added together and multiplied
by the conversion factor so that the formula for MPFS payment rates ends up
looking like this: [(PW RVU x PW GPCI) + (PE RVU x PE GPCI) + (MP RVU x
MP GPCI)] x CF = payment amount.45 However, in recent years, the
conversion factor has not been applied.46
The conversion factor is updated annually and based upon a
comparison of the actual inflation of medical costs, as measured by the
Medicare Economic Index (MEI), and the target rate for medical
expenditures, as established by the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR).47
According to CMS, the SGR is based on a combination of “medical
inflation, the projected growth in the domestic economy, projected growth of
[Medicare] beneficiaries . . . and changes in law or regulation.”48 However,
as Paul Ginsberg points out, this policy is frustrating to both physicians and
policy makers, and it has not been enforced since 2003.49 As medical
expenses have continued to rise unchecked by the SGR, rates now exceed
the SGR by nearly 25%.50 Despite the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO)
estimates that the annual override could cost the government nearly $330
billion in unanticipated costs by 2020,51 the payment reform is regarded as
the more appropriate method to improve rising costs and poor quality in
healthcare.52

43. The CPT is the charge a provider would designate for a performed service when
applying for Medicare reimbursement. See AMA/SPECIALTY SOCIETY, supra note 33, at 4. See
also FURROW ET AL., supra note 20, at 790.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(b)(1)(A)-(C) (2011).
45. Id. See also MPFS FACT SHEET, supra note 34, at 3.
46. Ginsberg, supra note 18, at 172.
47. MPFS FACT SHEET, supra note 34, at 3.
48. Id.
49. Ginsberg, supra note 18, at 172. Ginsberg explains that “budget legislation in 1997
created the more stringent SGR formula, which allowed smaller utilization increases and tied
the formula to the ups and downs of the broader economy. The SGR resulted in annual
updates to the fee schedule at or above the Medicare Economic Index until 2002, when a
4.8% reduction occurred, setting the stage for Congress to repeatedly block subsequent sharp
rate reductions. When the SGR formula called for another large decrease in rates in 2003,
Congress blocked the cut.” Id.
50. Id. at 176.
51. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATE OF CHANGES IN NET FEDERAL OUTLAYS FROM
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR CHANGING PHYSICIAN PAYMENT RATES IN MEDICARE 2 (2010).
52. Ginsberg, supra note 18, at 176.
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In addition to establishing the MPFS, the Secretary of HHS is also
charged with periodic review and adjustment of the values.53 According to
the statute, the Secretary is required to review all values no less than every
five years and make any needed adjustments.54 In addition to this five-year
review process, CMS annually evaluates new services and makes
adjustments to the values of existing services.55 This process can be quite
extensive as there are over 7,600 CPT codes with corresponding RVUs.56 In
order to cope with this large demand, CMS began relying on outside
recommendations almost immediately, mainly from the AMA’s RUC.57
Established in tandem with the RBRVS, the RUC is a formation of the AMA
that was created to provide annual recommendations to CMS regarding
changes to the RBRVS values.58 To assist in its recommendations, the RUC
sends out as many as 1,000 physician surveys, but only requires 30
responses in order to value a physician service.59
Further, the original membership of the RUC in 1991 was designed “to
include all major specialties, primarily defined as the 24 Member Boards of
the American Board of Medical Specialties.”60 Future seats on the RUC have
been determined by the following criteria:
1. The specialty is an American Board of Medical Specialties specialty.
2. The specialty comprises 1% of physicians in practice.
3. The specialty comprises 1% of physician Medicare expenditures.
4. Medicare revenue is at least 10% of mean practice revenue for the
specialty.

53. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(c)(2)(B) (2011).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(c)(2)(B)(i) (2011).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(c)(2)(B)(ii)(I) (2011) (discussing the Secretary’s discretion to
assign values to new services and adjust rankings of existing services).
56. Medicare Program; Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule,
77 Fed. Reg. 68896 (Nov. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt 410, 414, 415, 421,
423, 425, 486, and 495).
57. AM. MED. ASS’N., supra note 5.
58. T. Reginald Harris, MD, Chairman, Am. Med. Ass’n, Physicians’ Current Procedural
Terminology (CPT), Statement before the Subcommittee on Health Data Needs, Standards,
and Security, National Committee on Vital Health Statistics, Department of Health and Human
Services (April 16, 1997), available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/97041614.htm [hereinafter
Harris Testimony].
59. Carlos J. Lavernia & Brian Parsley, Medicare Reimbursement: An Orthopedic Primer,
21 J. ARTHROPLASTY (SUPP. 2) 6, 7 (2006). See also AM. MED. ASS’N. supra note 33 (“The
societies are required to survey at least 30 practicing physicians.”).
60. AM. MED. ASS’N. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, REPORT 14 OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES (A-08)
THE RUC: RECENT ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE THE VALUATION OF PRIMARY CARE SERVICES, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/rbrvs/rucbotreport.pdf.
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5. The specialty is not meaningfully represented by an umbrella
organization, as determined by the RUC.61
The AMA maintains that the RUC is “an independent group exercising its
First Amendment Right to petition the federal government” and explicitly
states that the RUC is not “an advisory committee to CMS.”62 However,
since its inception, it has appeared to function in exactly that capacity,63 and
has come under intense criticism in recent years for the vast discrepancy
between the pay for specialist services and that for primary care services.64
Kerry Weems, former CMS administrator, believes that the institutional
presence of the RUC has helped lead to the poor state of primary care in
the U.S.;65 the exact problem for which the new MPFS was created to
avoid.66 Weems describes CMS as an agency that struggles with resource
and staffing constraints directly affecting health reform.67 Among these
problems is the reliance on the RUC.
The intent behind creating the RUC may have been to delegate power to
an independent body to inject its expertise into the RBRVS payment system;68
however, it appears that CMS has entrusted too much responsibility to the
RUC.69 Weems describes the RBRVS as an “input measurement system,”
which relies heavily on the cost of inputs and the effect of that cost on the
pricing of outputs.70 Because the assessment process “delineates and
quantifies a service’s inputs in terms of its Relative Value Units which, with a
monetary multiplier, define its worth,”71 this process can easily result in
misvalued services. This can quickly escalate costs and pricing, thus ruining
the reliability and sustainability of the Medicare reimbursement system.
In effect, the RBRVS is a microcosm of the fee-for-service issue in
Medicare payment. Except with the RBRVS, the potential abuse is not
unnecessarily escalating volume, but unnecessarily adjusting cost for
preferred services. For example, one study considers evidence of errors in
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 9.
AM. MED. ASS’N., supra note 5.
See Infra Part IV.
John K. Inglehart, Doing More with Less: A Conversation with Kerry Weems, 28
HEALTH AFF. w688, w695 (2009).
65. Id. at w695.
66. Ginsberg, supra note 18, at 173.
67. Inglehart, supra note 64, at w688.
68. See AM. MED. ASS’N., supra note 5.
69. Ann Marie Marciarille & J. Bradford DeLong, Bending the Health Cost Curve: The
Promise and Peril of the Independent Payment Advisory Board, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 75, 107
(2012).
70. Inglehart, supra note 64, at w695.
71. Brian Klepper & David Kibbe, Rethinking the Value of Medical Services, HEALTH AFF.
BLOG (August 1, 2011, 2:08 PM), http://www.heatthaffairs.org/blog/2011/08/01/rethinkingthe-value-of-medical-services/.
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Medicare’s prices for hospital care and physician services and discusses
ways to improve the accuracy of those prices and identifies the need to
conduct data analyses in consultation with the RUC.72 These analyses would
identify services that have experienced substantial changes in volume, site of
service, and other factors that may indicate changes in resource
requirements.73
The author’s particular study found that in cardiovascular services with
high rates of volume growth, the work component of that RVU stayed
relatively constant over a 12-year period, despite the inclination that
cardiologists became more adept at performing these procedures.74
According to the authors of this study, the RUC does little to account for
overvalued RVUs as exemplified in the above instance.75 While CMS
accounts for changes to RVUs during a five-year periodic review, seldom are
overvalued services identified.76 In fact, numerous studies have concluded
that specialty work value units are inflated across the board and that many
of these RVUs should be reduced as a reflection of productivity gains within
that particular specialty practice.77
Another example of skewed RVU assessment describes the rapid growth
of imaging services and recent changes in how Medicare reimburses for
these services.78 The authors of the study claim that certain imaging services
may still be overvalued by CMS, thus inflating Medicare spending, again
due to the RUC’s improper RVU valuation.79 Among the solutions offered by
the authors was a suggestion that the RUC review values to ensure that their
“time estimates reflect advances in technology . . . .”80 These two studies
offer similar conclusions about inflated physician work values as part of a
larger trend in Medicare spending: RVUs are often overvalued for specialty

72. Kevin J. Hayes et al., Getting the Price Right: Medicare Payment Rates or
Cardiovascular Service, 26 HEALTH AFF. 124, 131 (2007).
73. Id. at 135.
74. Id. at 133.
75. Id.
76. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT
POLICY 87 (Mar. 2010).
77. ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 21, at 618 (citing MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY
COMM’N, supra note 76, at 87); Jerry Cromwell et al., Missing Productivity Gains in the
Medicare Physician Fee Schedule: Where Are They?, 67 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 676, 678
(2010); and Thomas Bodenheimer et al., The Primary Care-Specialty Income Gap: Why It
Matters, 146 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 301, 305 (2007).
78. Ariel Winter & Nancy Ray, Paying Accurately for Imaging Services in Medicare, 27
HEALTH AFF. 1479, 1479 (2008).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1488.
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care and undervalued for primary care physician services.81 The growing
difference in reimbursement rates under the MPFS between specialists and
primary care physicians has become known as the physician payment gap,
and has provided plenty of fodder for critics of the RUC, most of who call
for drastic overhaul of the RBRVS system.82 The physician payment gap is
believed to have led to a number of other complications within the field of
primary care and the healthcare industry as a whole;83 yet, it goes unsolved.
The American public likely has little sympathy for a primary care
physician who complains about payment discrepancies because incomes of
the physicians are wildly higher than that of the average American. But this
discrepancy in pay is a prime reason that U.S. medical students turn to
specialty careers over primary care.84 The discrepancy is only aggravated by
private insurance.85 In fact, the primary care-specialty fee gap is actually
larger for private plans than for Medicare,86 which demonstrates that many
of the principles of Medicare payment reform are incorporated in the
systems of private insurers and Medicaid programs,87 and emphasizes the
leverage of Medicare in price-setting.

81. ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 21, at 618. Other examples include comparing a
“moderately complex primary care office visit” for an established patient with “an
ophthalmologist’s 10-15 minute cataract extraction and implantation of an intra-ocular lens.”
Klepper & Kibbe, supra note 71. The comparative ratio for the value of these two services is
greater than 1:7, respectively. Id. In 2011, Medicare paid $111.36 for the primary care
physician visit and a total of $836.36 for the visit to the ophthalmologist. Id. Further,
“[c]ataract removal, a 50 year old procedure that has been highly refined and automated,
immediately improves sight, a dramatic impact. Many ophthalmologists operate ‘focused
factories,’ processing an assembly line of 20 or more cataract patients. With pre-screened
patients and a controlled clinical environment, the risks are relatively predictable, the mental
demands limited and the work repetitive.” Id.
82. ROBERT GRAHAM CTR., SPECIALTY AND GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE PHYSICIAN
WORKFORCE: WHAT INFLUENCES MEDICAL STUDENT AND RESIDENT CHOICES? 2, 32 (2009). See,
e.g., Allan H. Goroll, Reforming Physician Payment, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2087, 2090
(2008) (“Viewing the current fee-for-service system, its institutional mechanisms, and proposed
modifications as structurally flawed, clinically questionable, and inadequate for the delivery of
robust primary care [Goroll] propose[s] fundamental reform of payment for primary care,
replacing volume-based payment with risk adjusted comprehensive payment for the delivery of
comprehensive primary care.”).
83. Dummit, supra note 30, at 14. According to Dummit, the MPFS has been cited as the
cause of numerous problems, including: “physician specialty imbalances, overuse of certain
well-paid services and underuse of poorly paid services, and physician payment inequities. Yet
even with such high stakes, ensuring the accuracy of the fee schedule continues to rely on
limited data.” Id.
84. Bodenheimer et al., supra note 77, at 301.
85. Id. at 304.
86. Id.
87. Ginsberg, supra note 18, at 172.
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In 2006, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC)88 first
addressed the leading causes of this discrepancy in its report to Congress on
Medicare Payment Policy.89 Included in MedPAC’s analysis were the
following factors: 1) the dominance of the RUC by specialists; 2) a majority
of review requests came from specialist societies; 3) a majority of the reviews
were for undervalued services; 4) the adjustments must be budget neutral;
and 5) “CMS generally accepts the RUC’s recommendations.”90 MedPAC’s
analysis is essentially a blueprint for most arguments against the RUC’s
current influence on Medicare payment and a starting point for future cost
control measures.
MedPAC’s recommendations for the RUC have not yet been heeded by
Congress to any effective degree, although past evidence suggests that in
order to reach creative solutions for Medicare pricing reform certain vitals
are required,91 including “divid[ing] industry groups by buying them off (at
least, a sufficient bloc of them) to reduce their opposition to difficult
payment reforms.”92 This was effectively done during the implementation of
the RBRVS. However, despite the RBRVS being designed “to lessen the fee
disparity between office visits — the bread and butter of primary care —
and procedures provided by specialists,”93 the payment gap widened
because the AMA allowed the RUC to be composed mostly of members
named to specialist societies, thus by “buying off” medical specialty groups,
the societies undermined the intent of the arrangement.94
CMS finally acknowledged the issue of overvalued codes, as discussed
in the MPFS rules for 2009 and 2010.95 Efforts are now on course to

88. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 76. MedPAC, an independent
congressional agency, advises Congress on Medicare payment issues. It was originally
established by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–33. Id. This includes health
plans participating in Medicare Advantage and providers operating through Medicare’s FFS
program. Id. In addition to advising the Congress on payments to health plans participating in
the Medicare Advantage program and providers in Medicare’s traditional fee-for-service
program, other responsibilities of MedPAC include analyzing access to care and quality of
care. Id.
89. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT
POLICY 133-35 (2006), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Mar06entire
Report.pdf.
90. ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 21, at 618.
91. Robert F. Coulam et al., Competitive Pricing and the Challenge of Cost Control in
Medicare, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 649, 650, 666-67 (2011) (aiming to develop prudent
purchasing through competitive pricing and examining Medicare price policy).
92. Id.
93. Bodenheimer et al., supra note 77, at 301.
94. Coulam et al., supra note 91, at 667 n.23.
95. See Potentially Misvalued Services Under the Physician Fee Schedule, 73 Fed. Reg.
69881 (Nov. 19, 2008) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 409-15, 423-24, 485-86,
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update the RBRVS, although this likely has little to do with revising the RUC,
but rather increasing review of potentially overvalued CPT codes.96
Additionally, efforts were recently included in the ACA to improve
overvalued codes.97 This is certainly a step in the right direction, however,
any creative approach to Medicare payment reform is likely to be thwarted
by the interest groups that are already financially well-endowed under the
current process.98
Other scholars have positioned themselves against the practice of the
RUC, claiming that the medical profession needs a drastic overhaul of the
current infrastructure governing the valuation of clinical services and
practice expenses, increased transparency, and increased input from experts
“who have the health of individuals, the nation, and the economy as their
highest priorities.”99 It is this desire for accountability that is driving the focus
of this argument. The RUC, as currently structured, is private and exclusive,
a grave concern for a committee so heavily involved in setting the MPFS.
Operating in such a capacity without adequate review has so far been
detrimental to the reimbursement for primary care physicians. While CMS
has recently expressed a need to review values for primary care values
under the RBRVS,100 a step further would be to subject the RUC to the review
standards by which every FAC abides.

489); Potentially Misvalued Services Under the Physician Fee Schedule, 74 Fed. Reg. 61775
(Nov. 25, 2009) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 410-15, 485, 498).
96. Paul B. Ginsburg, Rapidly Evolving Physician-Payment Policy – More Than the SGR,
364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 172, 174 (2011).
97. See Refinements to the RVUs, 76 Fed. Reg. 73034 (Nov. 28, 2011) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. pts. 410, 414, 415, et al.); ACA § 3134(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w4(c)(2)(K)(ii) (2011)) (identifying several categories of potentially misvalued codes for review,
including: codes for new technologies or services; frequently billed codes associated with a
single service, common codes with low relative values; and codes that have not been reviewed
since the inception of the RBRVS).
98. See Peter V. Lee & David Lansky, Making Space for Disruption: Putting Patients at the
Center of Health Care, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1345, 1346 (2008) (examining the effect of regulation
and legislation on cost-effective care). Lee and Lansky call out the RUC for its high consistency
of procedural specialists and for containing “not one patient, purchaser, or payer” on the
committee. Id.
99. John D. Goodson, Unintended Consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale
Reimbursement, 298 JAMA 2308, 2310 (2007). See also Laurence F. McMahon Jr. & Vineet
Chopra, Health Care Cost and Value: The Way Forward, 307 JAMA 671, 671-72 (2012)
(outlining the existing approaches to controlling health care costs: 1) a cost-centric approach
and 2) value-centric approach). The U.S. can no longer afford to allow its health priorities to
be determined solely on cost or value basis alone. Instead, the medical market should reflect
clinical values for procedures which have already been analyzed and market those services
according to their clinical value. Id. at 672.
100. Potentially Misvalued Services Under the Physician Fee Schedule, 73 Fed. Reg. at
69881; 74 Fed. Reg. at 61775. See also MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO
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III. FISCHER V. BERWICK
On August 8, 2011, six primary care physicians filed suit against CMS
and HHS for accepting recommendations by the RUC without due
consideration.101 The physicians charged that the effects of the RUCs
recommendations contributed to a significant payment gap between primary
care physicians and specialists.102 The complaint directly challenged CMS’s
failure to comply with the FACA, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the
ACA, the Mandamus Act, the Delegation Clause of the United States
Constitution, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.103
More plainly, the physicians charged that CMS was in violation of the
APA and FACA for “utilizing the [RUC] as an uncharted and unofficial
Federal Advisory Committee . . . in that CMS directly manages, utilizes, and
relies upon the AMA RUC in the relative valuation process that forms the
basis of the [MPFS].”104 In their request for relief, the physicians requested
declaratory judgment that CMS had violated the FACA by “failing to allow
public petitioning of the AMA RUC, failing to provide public access to
records of the AMA RUC meetings, and failing to ensure that the AMA RUC
is constituted of members that have a balanced representation of views.”105
The suit thrust the previously anonymous RUC into the political spotlight,
which prompted a coordinated defense campaign from the “RUC, the AMA,
and 47 medical specialty societies.”106

THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 90 (2012), available at http://medpac.gov/docu
ments/Mar12_EntireRe port.pdf.
101. Complaint, supra note 12, at 2-3. See also Klepper, supra note 9; Six Primary Care
Physicians Sue CMS, Claim Doc Payment System Favors Specialists, BLOOMBERG BNA 1
(August 12, 2011), http://www.bna.com/six-primary-care-n12884903037/.
102. Complaint, supra note 12, at 48.
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id. at 2-3.
105. Id. at 3.
106. Klepper, supra note 9. Compare Joel Klepper, A Letter from America’s Medical
Specialty Societies to Rep. McDermott (D-WA), CARE & COST (April 8, 2011), http://care
andcost.com/2011/04/08/a-letter-from-americas-medical-specialty-societies-to-rep-mcder
mott-d-wa/ (in response to his remarks before the House Ways & Means Committee, and to
legislation he recently introduced, H.R. 1256), with Barbara Levy, The RUC - Providing
Valuable Expertise to the Medicare Program for Twenty Years, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (March 28,
2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Columns/2011/March/032811levy.aspx (Chair of
the AMA/ Specialty Society Relative Value Scale Update Committee defending the RUC and its
value), and Letter from Michael D. Maves, Executive V.P., Am. Med. Ass’n., to Rep. Jim
McDermott (D-WA) (April 5, 2011) (on file with author), available at http://careandcost.files.
wordpress.com/2011/04/maves-ama-mcdermott-ltr-40511.pdf (in response to his remarks
before the House Ways & Means Committee, and to legislation he recently introduced, H.R.
1256).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

188

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 7:175

This challenge brought unprecedented attention to the RUC.107 It
prompted Representative Jim McDermott (D-WA) to introduce a bill,108 the
Medicare Physician Payment Transparency and Assessment Act of 2011,
which aims “to require the use of analytic contractors in identifying and
analyzing misvalued physician services under the Medicare physician fee
schedule and an annual review of potentially misvalued codes under that
fee schedule.”109 In other words, the bill demanded that CMS replace, or at
least supplement, the RUC with a neutral third-party analysis when
determining reimbursement rates.110 However, this total overhaul may not
be necessary to ensure a more public process.
Representative McDermott, a long-time critic of the RUC, called for
sanctioning of the RUC as a FAC, thus subjecting it to transparency and
accountability,111 claiming that no group influences price setting more in
healthcare, and that the RUC is more of a concern to long-term
sustainability of Medicare than the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR).112
McDermott goes on to challenge that CMS’s job is to set rates “in the public
interest and not in the interest of powerful physician specialties,” claiming
that increased transparency would not only provide for fairer decisions, but it
would also benefit “the health of Americans as well as our federal
budget.”113
The RUC and its influence is more recognized now than it has been
since its inception, but its process and rationale still remain secret. The
physician suit in Fischer v. Berwick aimed to change that, but regrettably it
was unsuccessful.114 Fischer hinged on a plain accusation, that in its
delegated power to create and evaluate RVUs for the MPFS, “CMS has
relied heavily upon the AMA RUC, to the extent that the AMA RUC now has
become a de facto Federal Advisory Committee and therefore must be
regulated according to the FACA.”115 For remedy, the physicians sought for
the RUC to be governed by the FACA and realigned as a FAC, as opposed

107. Klepper, supra note 9.
108. Medicare Physician Payment Transparency and Assessment Act of 2011, H.R. 1256,
112th Cong. (2011).
109. Id.
110. Press Release, Congressman Jim McDermott, McDermott’s Statement on CMS
Lawsuit, (Aug. 8, 2011), http://mcdermott.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=510:mcdermotts-statement-on-cms-lawsuit&catid=25:press-releases&Itemid=20.
111. Jim McDermott, Harnessing Our Opportunity to Make Primary Care Sustainable, 364
NEW ENG. J. MED. 395, 396 (2011).
112. Id.
113. Press Release, Congressman Jim McDermott, supra note 110.
114. Fischer v. Berwick, No. WMN-11-2191, 2012 WL 1655320, at *1 (D. Md. May 9,
2012).
115. Complaint, supra note 12, at 11.
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to operating as a private body petitioning CMS. Despite the favorable fact
scenario, the court was precluded from adjudicating the issue and dismissed
the plaintiffs’ action.116
In a Memorandum to the Opinion, the court discussed why it decided to
dismiss the plaintiffs’ action.117 Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs’
action on grounds that judicial review of the Secretary’s determinations is
barred under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395w4(i)(1)(B).118 The court agreed stating that Congress has precluded courts
from reviewing the final relative values and RVUs and also the method by
which those values and units were generated.119
Plaintiffs’ claims implicated part of the actual determinations of RVUs
and fell within the bar of § 1395w-4(i)(1). The statute, entitled “Restriction
on Administrative and Judicial Review,” plainly states:
There shall be no administrative or judicial review under section 1395ff of
this title or otherwise of –– (A) the determination of the adjusted historical
payment basis . . . (B) the determination of relative values and relative value
units . . . including adjustments . . . and (E) the establishment of the system
for the coding of physicians’ services . . . .”120

While the court assumed the factual validity of the plaintiffs’ argument,121 it
determined among the defendant’s many arguments that it was correct in
asserting that the plaintiffs could not bring judicial review that is otherwise
barred.122 The court held:
Accepting as true that RUC plays a major role in the formation of the PFS
and also accepting as true that this role unfairly skews the PFS toward
certain medical professions and procedures, the Court, nonetheless, finds
that Congress has precluded courts from reviewing, not only the final
relative values and RVUs, but also the method by which those values and
units are generated.123

The court spends a majority of its opinion discussing the bar on judicial
review, its comprehensiveness, and the statutory interpretation of the bar in
previous suits.124 While the court spends a small portion of its opinion on
116. Fischer, 2012 WL 1655320, at *1.
117. See id.
118. Id. at *1.
119. Id. at *2.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 13951-4(i)(1) (2012).
121. Fischer, 2012 WL 1655320, at *2.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id. at *3-5 (reviewing Am. Soc’y of Cataract & Refractive Surgery v. Thompson,
279 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 2002); Am. Soc’y of Anesthesiologists v. Shalala, 90 F.Supp.2d. 973
(N.D. Ill. 2000); and Am. Coll. of Cardiology v. Sebelius, Civ. No. 09–62034, 2010 WL
9463882 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2010)).
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the applicability of the Due Process Clause, it allocates none of the opinion
to discussing whether or not the RUC ought to be subjected to the FACA.
As Brian Klepper explains, the court was confronted by two conflicting
federal laws.125 The first, as established by Congress, operates as a
prohibition on the courts and bars the current valuation of Medicare
payments from judicial review.126 The second, the FACA, requires that
groups advising the federal government abide by a set of regulated
transparency standards, including public hearing and notice of meetings,127
which is not required of the RUC. By focusing solely on the issue of
judiciability, the court was able to avoid any substantive discussions
regarding the RUC and the FACA.128 The following section of this note will
elaborate on the history and applicability of the FACA and discuss whether it
can be applied to the RUC.
IV. FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT OF 1972
The FACA was passed as a response to the rapid growth of FACs, for
which there were no previous standards of cost or accountability.129 By
passing the FACA, Congress aimed to make advisory committees more
“accountable, transparent, balanced, and independent from influence of
special interests.”130 A product of the “good-government” phase of the
early-1970s, the FACA was intentioned to keep Congress and the public
educated about “the number, purpose, membership, and activities” of any
group which offered advice or recommendation to the federal
government.131 Further, the FACA was passed in order to address the exact
concern that the RUC’s specialist-heavy panel exemplifies: a “concern that
some interests had come to enjoy uncheck[ed] and perhaps illicit access to
federal executive decisionmakers.”132
Unfortunately, the implementation of the FACA has not always achieved
these goals, and a study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
determined that appointments to some FACs133 were made based on
ideology of the appointer and not based upon experience, nor were the

125. Klepper, supra note 8.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(i)(1)(B) (2011).
127. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2(b)(4)-(5) (2011).
128. Klepper, supra note 8.
129. Examining the Federal Advisory Committee Act – Current Issues and Developments:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Info. Policy, Census, & Nat’l Archives of the. Comm. on
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Examining the FACA].
130. Id.
131. Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Good
Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 452 (1997).
132. Id. at 453.
133. The GAO did not disclose the specific FACs in question.
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appointees screened for conflicts of interests.134 Especially in the case of
sensitive and controversial issues, it is the goal of the FACA to ensure that
the federal government has the assistance of a plethora of assessments, but
the FACA sometimes falls short of this goal, which is why in 2008, the
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform sought to examine
and amend the FACA.135
This is not to say that the accountability issues are pervasive throughout
FACs, or that the RUC is somehow better off not abiding by a broken
system. Instead, it should be seen as a testament to the resolve of Congress
to hold FACs accountable to the public and confirm the intentions of the
FACA to dissolve special interests from controlling Washington.136
While the RUC has never been sanctioned under the FACA as a FAC, it
is not any less influential.137 In the context of the possible 2008 amendments
to the FACA, the GAO spoke out in favor of the greater accountability for
federal advisory opinions:
Federal advisory committees have been called the ‘fifth arm of government’
because of the significant role they play in advising federal agencies, the
Congress, and the President on important national issues. To be effective,
advisory committees must be –– and, just as importantly, be perceived as
being –– independent and balanced as a whole. As we reported in 2004,
controversies regarding the federal advisory committee system have
included concerns that some appointments have been based on ideology
rather than expertise or were weighted to favor one group of stakeholders
over others.138

134. See also Examining the FACA, supra note 129, at 2.
135. Id. at 1, 3. See also Federal Advisory Committee Act Amendments of 2008, H.R.
5687, 110th Cong. (2008). While the bill passed the House, it died in the Senate but has
been reintroduced several times: H.R. 1320, 111th Cong. (as introduced, Mar 05, 2009);
H.R. 3124, 112th Cong. (as introduced, Oct 06, 2011). As of this publication the bill has not
yet become law.
136. Examining the FACA, supra at 129, at 1. Examples of FACs include the U.S. Military
Academy Board of Visitors or The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Public Advisory Committee Charter.
The Department of Commerce alone contains upwards of 60 FACs. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES, available at http://webcache.googleusercontent.
com/search?q=cache:http://www.osec.doc.gov/opog/faca.html.
137. Miriam J. Laugesen, Roy Wada & Eric M. Chen, In Setting Doctors’ Medicare Fees,
CMS Almost Always Accepts the Relative Value Update Panel’s Advice on Work Values, 31
HEALTH AFF. 965, 968 (2012) (finding that “CMS accepted 2,419 (87.4 percent) of the 2,768
work values proposed by the update committee”).
138. Federal Advisory Committee Act Issues Related to the Independence and Balance of
Advisory Committees: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Info. Policy, Census, & Nat’l Archives
of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 11 (2008) (statement of Robin
M. Nazzaro, Director, National Resources and Enviornment, Government Accountability
Office) (emphasis added).
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Other specifications for agencies operating FACs include: prior
announcement of committee meetings, notice to interested parties about
attendance, that meetings be open to the public, and that meeting minutes
are publically available.139 Of course, none of the well-intentioned
amendments or current regulations under the FACA even apply to the RUC,
unless it can be established as a FAC.
According to the GAO, it is the responsibility of the General Services
Administration (GSA) to prescribe administrative guidelines and
management controls for all advisory committees.140 However, the GSA
cannot approve or deny any agency decision to create a FAC or any actions
regarding the management of that committee,141 and that is an issue for
judicial review.142
In the case of the RUC, because it was not created or initialized by CMS,
it may have escaped the regulation guidelines established by the GSA and
the FACA.143 However, according to the guidelines of the FACA,144 and
certainly in the opinion of the physicians in Fischer,145 the fact that the RUC
was established by the AMA and not by CMS146 is irrelevant.
The FACA states that a FAC is “any committee, board, commission,
council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar group [that is] . . .
established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest of obtaining
advice or recommendations for . . . one or more agencies or officers of the
Federal Government . . . .”147 This phrase alone should be the requisite
means to enforce the FACA against the RUC, but it may not be that simple.
According to a statutory interpretation by the Court in Public Citizen v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “the word ‘utilize’ . . . was not to be taken literally, but
rather was properly understood as an extension and qualification of the term

139. Id. at 13.
140. Federal Advisory Committee Act Issues Related to the Independence and Balance of
Advisory Committees: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Info. Policy, Census, & Nat’l Archives
of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 32 (2008) (statement of Robert
Flaak, Director, Committee Management Secretariat, U.S. General Service Administration).
141. Id. at 14.
142. See Croley & Funk, supra note 131, at 513-14 (discussing judicial review of FACA
claims and enforceability of the courts upon successful prosecution).
143. Harris Testimony, supra note 58. See generally AM. MED. ASS’N., supra note 5
(explaining that the RUC is supported by the AMA and does advise the CMS).
144. 5 U.S.C. App. § 3(2)(C) (2012).
145. Complaint, supra note 12, at 12.
146. Harris Testimony, supra note 58. See generally AM. MED. ASS’N., supra note 5
(explaining that the RUC is supported by the AMA and does advise the CMS).
147. 5 U.S.C. App. § 3(2)(C) (2012) (emphasis added).
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‘establish.’”148 Accordingly, the Court in Public Citizen looked into the
legislative history of the FACA and found:
The phrase ‘or utilized’ therefore appears to have been added simply to
clarify that FACA applies to advisory committees established by the Federal
Government in a generous sense of that term, encompassing groups formed
indirectly by quasi-public organizations such as the National Academy of
Sciences ‘for’ public agencies as well as ‘by’ such agencies themselves.
Read in this way, the term ‘utilized’ would meet the concerns of the
authors . . . that advisory committees . . . ‘utilized by a department or
agency in the same manner as a Government-formed advisory
committee’ . . . would be subject to FACA’s requirements.149

It is not surprising that given the above interpretation,150 and the subsequent
disagreement,151 that the most commonly litigated issue under the FACA
pertains to the process and determination by which a given group becomes
subject to the regulations under the FACA.152 Given the Court’s holding in
Public Citizen, it could be discerned that the RUC would not qualify at all
under the FACA, since while it is utilized by CMS in its determination of
RVUs, it was not “directly established” by or for CMS.153
V. FISCHER V. BERWICK REVISITED
Regardless of the deterrents of previous decisions and the confusing
statutory language of the FACA, the physicians in Fischer challenged the
RUC on several provisions within the FACA,154 including membership,155
recommendations,156 public access,157 availability of committee records,158
148. Croley & Funk, supra note 131, at 469 (interpreting the majority opinion in Public
Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 452-53 (1989)). Additionally, Croley and Funk
point out “the Conference Report, which actually added the words ‘or utilized’ to the billwithout explaining the reason for the addition-stated generally that the bill did not apply to
‘advisory committees not directly established by or for [federal] agencies.’” Croley & Funk,
supra note 131, at 478 (citing H.R. REP. No. 92-1403, at 10 (1972)).
149. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 462-63.
150. Id. at 452. The court further stated, “‘[u]tilize’ is a woolly verb, its contours left
undefined by the statute itself. Read unqualifiedly, it would extend FACA’s requirements to any
group of two or more persons, or at least any formal organization, from which the President or
an executive agency seeks advice. We are convinced that Congress did not intend that result.”
151. Id. at 474-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring: “[o]ne would have thought at least that the
Court would have been led to consider how the specific purposes Congress identified for this
legislation might shed light on the reasons for the change. Not only does the Court’s decision
today give inadequate respect to the statute passed by Congress, it also gives inadequate
deference to the GSA’s regulations interpreting FACA.” Id. at 477).
152. Croley & Funk, supra note 131, at 471.
153. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 462; MED. ASSOC., supra note 5.
154. See Complaint, supra note 12, at 12-15.
155. 5 U.S.C. App. § 5(b)(2) (2012).
156. 5 U.S.C. App. § 5(b)(3) (2012).
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and oversight.159 In order to initialize the regulation of these provisions, the
physicians in Fischer relied on recognition by the U.S. Supreme Court that
groups utilized by federal agencies can become de facto FACs under the
decision in Public Citizen.160 Further, the physicians in Fischer allege that de
facto FACs are “those committees under the ‘actual management or
control’ of a federal agency,”161 as well as “those committees utilized by a
department or agency in the same manner as a Government-formed
advisory committee.”162 Thus, as CMS is charged with developing RVUs,163
but ends up accepting a substantial majority of the RUC’s recommendations
for those values,164 it is conceivable to align the RUC’s operation in tandem
with CMS with the statutory interpretation of “utilization” under the FACA.165
Regardless of the court’s refusal to address this issue166 and similar
previous holdings,167 it appears that the RUC should indeed be governed by
the FACA. In American Society of Dermatology v. Shalala,168 a similar case
brought against CMS, the court found that CMS did not meet the standard
of “actual management or control,”169 even though the court concluded
that the RUC is “a limited number of private citizens who are brought
together to give publicized advice as a group.”170 The physicians in Fischer
disagreed and challenged the court to revisit this concept.171 The physicians
in Fischer rely on both the language of Shalala, and another case,

157. 5 U.S.C. App. § 10(a)(1)-(3) (2012).
158. 5 U.S.C. App. §§ 10(b), 11(a), 10(c) (2012).
159. 5 U.S.C. App. § 7(b), 8(b) (2012).
160. Complaint, supra note 12, at 15 (citing Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491
U.S. 440 (1989)).
161. Id. at 20 (citing Wash. Legal Found. v. United States Sentencing Comm’n, 17 F.3d
1446, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
162. Id. (citing Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 457).
163. 42 C.F.R. § 414.22 (2009).
164. As noted by Kerry Weems, CMS has accepted a substantial majority of the RUC’s
recommendations, 87.4 percent, to be exact. See Letter from Kerry Weems, Acting
Administrator, CMS, to William L. Rich, M.D., Chair of the RUC, (June 19, 2008) (on file with
author), available at www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/380/cmsapplause.pdf. See
also Laugesen, Wada, & Chen, supra note 137, at 968 (finding that “between 1994 and
2010 found that CMS agreed with 87.4 percent of the committee’s recommendations”).
165. 5 U.S.C. App. § 3(2)(C) (2012).
166. See Fischer, 2012 WL 1655320, at *2.
167. Am. Soc’y of Dermatology v. Shalala, 962 F. Supp. 141, 146 (1996) (examining the
advisory role of other AMA committees, but not the RUC); Am. Soc’y of Cataract & Refractive
Surgery v. Thompson, 279 F.3d 447, 449 (7th Cir. 2002) (challenging the formula by which
the RVUs are calculated during a congressionally mandated transition period).
168. Shalala, 962 F. Supp. at 141.
169. Id. at 147.
170. Id. at 148.
171. Complaint, supra note 12, at 89.
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Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton,172 which,
among other conclusions, found that certain “working groups” upon which
a governmental entity relied were FACs to the extent that they provided
advice or recommendations on which the federal government relied. The
court held:
The point, it seems to us, is that a group is a FACA advisory committee
when it is asked to render advice or recommendations, as a group, and not
as a collection of individuals. The group’s activities are expected to, and
appear to, benefit from the interaction among the members both internally
and externally.173

The physicians in Fischer rely directly upon this analysis in Clinton, asserting
that CMS relies on data generated by the RUC, and that the RUC itself is “a
formal group,”174 and not “a collection of individuals”175 which presents its
findings to CMS.176 The court does not address this issue of reliance as a de
facto advisement, thus ignoring the argument under the Clinton standard
altogether, but instead, focuses solely on the statutory provision barring
judicial review of value determinations and methodology.177
The holding in Clinton is crucial to the physicians’ argument. In addition
to the “working groups” holding, the Clinton court established a continuum
for determining whether or not a particular group is subject to the FACA.178
The court wrote:
When we examine a particular group or committee to determine whether
FACA applies, we must bear in mind that a range of variations exist in terms
of the purpose, structure, and personnel of the group. Perhaps it is best
characterized as a continuum. At one end one can visualize a formal group
of a limited number of private citizens who are brought together to give
publicized advice as a group. That model would seem covered by the statute
regardless of other fortuities such as whether the members are called
‘consultants.’ At the other end of the continuum is an unstructured
arrangement in which the government seeks advice from what is only a
collection of individuals who do not significantly interact with each other.
That model, we think, does not trigger FACA.179

172. Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir 1993);
Am. Soc’y of Dermatology v. Shalala, 962 F. Supp. 141 (1996).
173. Clinton, 997 F.2d at 913 (emphasis added). See also Croley & Funk, supra note
131, at 455.
174. Clinton, 997 F.2d at 915.
175. Id.
176. See Complaint, supra note 12, at 52.
177. Fischer, 2012 WL 1655320, at *1-2.
178. Clinton, 997 F.2d at 915.
179. Id. at 915 (emphasis added).
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The physicians in Fischer address this issue directly, claiming that the RUC is
a “structured committee consisting of 26 voting members and a
Chairperson who regularly meet and give their advice as a group to CMS,”
thereby qualifying it under the structured end of the Clinton continuum.180
Interestingly enough, the Fischer court ignored this rationale and paid no
attention to the holding in Clinton, instead the court looked to American
Society of Cataract and Refractive Surgery v. Thompson.181
The Thompson court found that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred under
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(i)(1)(B), holding that there is “strong presumption that
Congress intends a judicial review of administrative action”182 and that “only
upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a contrary legislative
intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review.”183 While it appears
that this provision may in fact bar judicial or administrative review of CMS’s
value determinations, it certainly does not preclude applicability of the FACA
to the RUC, which was perhaps the intention of the physicians when they
brought suit.184 If regulatory or legislative changes occur, such as removing
the judiciability bar or subjecting the RUC to the FACA, the RUC could likely
be found in violation of the FACA.
Regrettably, it is nearly impossible to bring a private challenge under the
FACA without first inducing the statutory immunity provision,185 which is
likely the reason the physicians in Fischer sought to challenge the
enforceability of the APA.186 For this, the physicians induced a ruling from a
recent D.C. Circuit case, Judicial Watch, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of
Commerce, which held that plaintiffs may bring FACA claims pursuant to the
APA, thereby avoiding the private cause of action limitations for challenges
under the FACA.187
However, under the requirements laid out by the FACA and Clinton, the
RUC is likely in violation of the FACA. Among the many challenges within
the Fischer complaint, the physicians charged that the RUC was in violation

180. Complaint, supra note 12, at 52-53.
181. Am. Soc’y of Cataract & Refractive Surgery v. Thompson, 279 F.3d 447 (7th Cir.
2002).
182. Id. at 452.
183. Id. (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)).
184. In their request for relief, plaintiffs sought injunction, thus freezing the relationship
between CMS and the RUC until the RUC complied with the FACA. See Klepper, supra note
9; Complaint, supra note 12, at 2-4.
185. See Croley & Funk, supra note 131, at 514-16 (discussing standing requirements for
private party claims under the FACA).
186. Complaint, supra note 12, at 16 (“Plaintiffs do not seek relief under FACA, but
instead seek relief pursuant to the APA for violation of FACA.”).
187. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 736 F. Supp. 2d 24, 30
(D.D.C. 2010).
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of several provisions within the FACA,188 including membership,189
recommendations,190 public access,191 availability of committee records,192
and oversight.193
First, the RUC likely meets the standard alleged by the physicians in
Fischer: the advisement practices of the RUC fall within the structured end of
the spectrum described in Clinton194 and under the principle of utilization as
described by Public Citizen.195 The RUC is, by its own admission, an expert
panel comprised of 31 members who annually evaluate RVUs and prepare
recommendations for CMS.196 The AMA concedes that CMS has adopted
nearly 95% of the RUC’s PW recommendations, which are free to the
federal government and cost the AMA, specialist societies, and other
healthcare organizations up to $7 million per year in expenses, and boasts
that “CMS could not replicate the resources to duplicate this process.”197
Further, the AMA admits that “[t]he high acceptance rate is very important to
the RUC [and that] [t]he RUC understands the boundaries within the RBRVS
and abides by the definitions constructed by CMS.”198 It is confirmed by the
AMA that “CMS has observers at each RUC meeting [and] [i]f a concern is
expressed, the RUC responds accordingly.”199 The AMA also describes the
RUC meetings as “deliberative discussion, often requiring in depth
facilitation.”200
Considering the significant amount of effort and determination required
by the RUC in their recommendations, as well as the self-admitted claim by
the AMA that CMS could not replicate this process without a significant cost
to taxpayers, it is understandable that the RUC is utilized by CMS in the
manner originally described by the U.S. Supreme Court in Public Citizen,201

188. See Complaint, supra note 12, at 12-15.
189. 5 U.S.C. App. § 5(b)(2) (2012).
190. 5 U.S.C. App. § 5(b)(3) (2012).
191. 5 U.S.C. App. § 10(a)(1)-(3) (2012).
192. 5 U.S.C. App. §§ 10(b); 11(a); 10(c) (2012).
193. 5 U.S.C. App. §§ 7(b); 8(b) (2012).
194. Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 915 (1993).
195. Public Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 463 (1989).
196. See AM. MED. ASS’N., supra note 5.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. Further, the AMA estimates that the RUC meetings last around 12 hours a day and
that each physician service is deliberated on to determine 13 different factors. This extensive
deliberation must be done for over 7000 different CPT codes, is “continuously evolving.” AM.
MED. ASS’N., supra note 5.
201. Public Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 462 (1989) (describing
that the phrase “or utilize” applies to advisory committees “established by the Federal
Government” and “encompass[es] groups formed indirectly by quasi-public
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especially in light of the Clinton decision.202 Here, the RUC operates
extensively and solely for the purpose of making recommendations to CMS
regarding the RBRVS.203 Further, the RUC was formed in conjunction with
the establishment of the RBRVS in 1992,204 and has been relied upon by the
CMS for over two decades.205 The best indicator that CMS is actually
dependant on the RUC for its recommendations might be the fact that the
RUC admits that CMS could not adequately replace the RUC without
sustaining substantial expenses. Of course, the substantial adoption rate of
recommendations206 cannot be ignored, especially if the process for
determination is as in depth as the AMA proclaims.207
Among the many issues with CMS’s reliance is the secrecy and
imbalance by which the RUC operates; the exact problem sought to be
eliminated under the FACA.208 Additionally, the FACA requires that a FAC
must be “fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented,”209
which until recently, was a serious problem for the RUC.210 Further, of the
RUC’s membership, only three of the 31 seats rotate while the other seats
have no term limits, and 11 RUC members have been on the committee for
at least eight years or more.211 The FACA also dictates that
recommendations of a FAC cannot be “inappropriately influenced by the

organizations. . . that advisory committees . . . ‘utilized by a department or agency in the
same manner as a Government-formed advisory committee’. . . would be subject to FACA’s
requirements.).
202. Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 913 (1993)
(holding that “a group is a FACA advisory committee when it is asked to render advice or
recommendations, as a group, and not as a collection of individuals. The group’s activities
are expected to, and appear to, benefit from the interaction among the members both
internally and externally.”).
203. See AM. MED. ASS’N., supra note 5.
204. See Maxwell & Zuckerman, supra note 19, at 65.
205. See supra Part II.
206. It should be noted that the exact figure for these adoptions often differs by study. See,
e.g., Letter from Kerry Weems to William Rich, supra note 164, at 1 (finding that CMS has
accepted a substantial majority of the RUC’s recommendations, 87.9%, to be exact);
Laugesen, Wada, & Chen, supra note 137, at 968 (finding that “between 1994 and 2010
found that CMS agreed with 87.4 percent of the committee’s recommendations”); AM. MED.
ASS’N., supra note 5 (boasting that CMS has adopted 95% of the RUC’s work relative value
recommendations).
207. See AM. MED. ASS’N., supra note 5.
208. Croley & Funk, supra note 131, at 452.
209. 5 U.S.C. App. § 5(b)(2) (2012). See also Complaint, supra note 12, at 13.
210. Charles Fiegl, RUC Adds 2 Seats for Primary Care, AM. MED. NEWS (February 13,
2012), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2012/02/13/gvsa0213.htm; Complaint, supra
note 12, at 28.
211. Complaint, supra note 12, at 28.
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appointing authority, in this case CMS, or by any special interest, but will
instead be the result of the advisory committee’s independent judgment.”212
While the AMA’s official stance corresponds with this provision,213 the
absence of a primary care representative from the committee for nearly 20
years is alarming. Further, the data clearly shows that during the time of
absence, the gap between specialist and primary care payments under the
RBRVS widened.214 A failsafe of the FACA, and one of the driving policies
behind its enactment, is the opportunity for public admittance to FAC
meetings.215 The RUC, however, not subject to the FACA, does not invite the
public to meetings, allow the public any input into the agenda meetings, nor
does the public have any access to records, minutes, transcripts, or
recordings of the meetings.216 Allegedly, only the RUC Chairperson may
extend invitations to meetings.217
VI. CONCLUSION
Considering the RUC’s aforementioned style of operations against the
provisions within the FACA, should a court decide it could review the RUC
against the FACA, it would likely be in clear violation. What is unmistakable
is the level of reliance by CMS upon the recommendations by the RUC, the
widening physician-specialist payment gap, and the privacy by which the
RUC operates. Legally, it can likely be concluded that the RUC is “utilized”
by CMS at the requisite level to engage the provisions within the FACA as a
de facto FAC. However, should imposition of the FACA upon the RUC prove
tedious or complicated, and at this point there have been no successful
legal challenges, several other options are available. The first option is the
introduction of the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB), an
independent, executive branch board created under the ACA, which has
been afforded the task of reforming Medicare’s procedure-based
reimbursement system.218 According to Ann Marie Marciarille and J.
Bradford DeLong, the IPAB could offer more “coherent, technocratic, and

212. 5 U.S.C. App. § 5(b)(3) (2012).
213. AM. MED. ASS’N., supra note 5 (stating that RUC members “exercise their independent
judgment and are not advocates for their specialty”).
214. Bodenheimer et al., supra note 77, at 301.
215. 5 U.S.C. App. § 10(a)(1)-(3) (2012). See also Croley & Funk, supra note 131, at
452.
216. Complaint, supra note 12, at 28.
217. Id.
218. See Ann Marie Marciarille & J. Bradford DeLong, Bending the Health Cost Curve: The
Promise and Peril of the Independent Payment Advisory Board, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 75, 78
(2012) (revealing the strengths and weaknesses of our hybrid healthcare system and the role
of specialist physician payments).
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cost-effectiveness oriented logic” to the Medicare payment system,219 but
others are much more skeptical.220 Much is still up for debate with the IPAB,
as it has yet to receive a nomination for a single member.221
Representative McDermott called for replacing the RUC, or at least
supplementing it with a neutral third-party committee.222 In an attempt to
neutralize the RUC of specialty favor, McDermott also introduced the
Medicare Physician Payment Transparency and Assessment Act of 2011.
Economist Uwe Reinhardt thanked the RUC for its tremendous work, but was
quick to condemn CMS’s slavish adoption of value recommendations and
calls for the task to be delegated instead to a “truly independent body.”223
The evidence is overwhelming. Since the inception of the RBRVS and the
RUC, physician payment discrepancies have not lessened, in fact, they have
worsened,224 and it is due in part to the RUC’s secrecy. While the RUC has
been under more scrutiny lately, with MedPAC proposals, congressional
bills, and the physician lawsuit in Fischer v. Berwick, change appears to be
imminent. The real question is when.
DAVID W. FUCHS*

219. Id. at 81. See also KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION PROGRAM ON MEDICARE POLICY, THE
INDEPENDENT PAYMENT ADVISORY BOARD: A NEW APPROACH TO CONTROLLING MEDICARE
SPENDING (2011).
220. Doug Schoen, The Final Push for IPAB Repeal, FORBES (March 15, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougschoen/2012/03/15/the-final-push-for-ipab-repeal/.
221. As of the publication of this paper, the President has yet to appoint a member to the
IPAB.
222. Press Release, Congressman Jim McDermott, supra note 110.
223. Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Little-Known Decision-Makers for Medicare Physicians Fees,
N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 10, 2010) available at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/
the-little-known-decision-makers-for-medicare-physicans-fees/.
224. Coulam et al., supra note 91, at 667 n.23.
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